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Abstract

The underlying premise of the urban transportation planning process is that we
can forecast the future. The process typically develops 20-year forecasts of traffic
volumes on each link of the transportation network. Planners then attempt to devise a
master plan that represents an optimal solution for the forecasted conditions. The
reality is that we cannot predict the future. Imponderable and unpredictable events
will shape the future in ways we cannot hope to anticipate. In addition, social and
political bias is a strong contributor to errors in anticipating future events and to our
willingness to deal with uncertainty. This paper identifies possible remedies for dealing with uncertainty and bias, including better analytical methods, better process
methods, and methods to counter bias. An evaluation ofvarious remedies is performed
and practical measures that can be applied to the urban transportation planning process are identified. Finally, specific recommended modifications to the urban transportation planning process are outlined.

A World of Change, Uncertainty, and Bias

"It's tough to tell the future."
So begins a report distributed by the Florida Department of Transportation
(1994) as background for the 2020 Florida Transportation Plan. It goes on to
note:
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Analyzinghistoricalandcw-renttrendsto forecastconditions20
or moreyearsintothe futurehasbeencomparedto throwingdarts
at a movingboardundera strobelight.The dynamicnatureof
social,economic,andpoliticalactivitiesin the UnitedStatesand
Floridacreatestoo manyuncertaintiesfor foolproofforecasting.

Twenty-fiveyearsearlier,Manheim( 1979)noted,"Welive in a worldof
rapid change."He identifiedthree dimensionsof changethat are relevantto
transportationsystems:changein demand,changein technology,and changein
values.We mightalso note a worldof uncertainty-not only is changeoccurring,but it is occurringin waysthatwe cannotanticipate.Othershavecitedthe
uncertaintyin future availabilityof resources(Neumannand Pecknold1973)
and in estimatingcosts(Wachs1986;Pickrell1990).
In additionto the objectivefact of our inabilityto accuratelypredictthe
future,a majorfeatureof urbantransportation
planningis the socialandpolitical
biasthat is evidentin technicalanalyses.Recognitionof uncertaintyis routinely
suppressed,bold assertionsare madeaboutfutureconditions,and forecastsare
intentionallymanipulatedto promotepolitically-motivated
conclusions.These
featuresare particularlyevidentin the planningof large-scaletransitguideway
investments.
TheUrbanTransportation
Planning
Technical
Process
Planningforurbantransportation
systemsinvolvestheapplicationandanalysis of technically complex simulation models within a highly political
decisionmakingenvironment.The conventionalprocessinvolvesdevelopment
of 20-yearforecastsof socio-economic
variables,such as populationand employment,.disaggregatedinto hundredsof trafficanalysiszones of the typical
metropolitanarea. Basedon the 20-yearsocio-economic
forecasts,a seriesof
sequentialmodelsare usedto developdetailedforecastsof demandson the future transportationnetwork.

Vol.2, No. /, 1998

Journalof PublicTransportation

29

Reality:ChangeCannotBePredicted
withCertainty
Theunderlyingpremiseof theurbantransportationplanningprocessis that
wecan forecastthe future.Therealityis thatthe modelsarehighlyimprecise,the
inputs to the models are impossibleto predict,and the forecastedresults are
almostsure to miss the mark.
Sources
ofUncertainty
in Transportation
PlanningModels

Loweand Richards( 1983)identifiedthree sourcesof error in transportation planningmodels:specification,calibration,and error in exogenousinputs.
Limitationsin the precisionof the transportationplanningmodels caused by
specificationand calibrationerrorpalein comparisonto the uncertaintyof forecastingexogenousinputs.Howprecisecan we be in forecastingsocialand economicfactors20 yearsinto the future?
Lookahead20 yearsintothefutureandimaginewhatthe UnitedStateswill
be like. Specifically,try to estimatethe nation'spopulationand employment20
years fromnow.Don't forgetto accountfor factorssuch as futurewars, major
recessions,the reliabilityof crude oil supplies,U.S. immigrationpolicy,and
futurefertilityand deathrates.
"Nowthink aboutwhat Florida'sshareof yournationalestimatewill be 20
years in the future. Don't forget to accountfor the future fall of Castro, the
politicalsituationin Haiti,futurenationalretirementlocationalpreferences,potentialdevelopmentmoratoria,and suppliesof potablewater.
Nowthat you haveaddressedall thesefactorsand are confidentwith your
estimatesof U.S.and Florida'spopulationand employment,thinkaboutwhatan
individualcountywithFlorida,e.g.HillsboroughCounty's,sharewillbe 20years
from now. Be sure to accountfor factors such as the status of rebuildingthe
TampaInterstate,the commercialsuccessof the FloridaAquarium,competition
by Orlando for tourists, and major corporaterelocations.Now, allocate the
HillsboroughCountyshareacross800 trafficanalysiszones.
Seemslikea prettyhopelessexercise,doesn'tit?Yet,this is exactlywhatwe
do, every time we preparea long range plan for an urbanizedarea. Moreover,
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advocatesof major capital investmentsroutinelyclaim to be able to estimate
traffic volumesor transitridership20 yearsintothe futureon individuallinks of
a hypotheticaltransportationnetwork.We developplans as if we could take a
rifle shot 20 yearsinto the futureandpredictthe precisemagnitudeand distribution of activitieswithina region.The realityis quitedifferent-more like a shotgun blast.

Examples
ofForecast
Performance
It can be instructiveto reviewexamplesof the past performanceof transportation forecaststo see just how accurateour forecastshave been. The examples presentedin the followingsectionsshowthat the track record of forecasts are not very reassuring.
TampaUrbanArea Transportation
Study.In 1970,a comprehensiveurban
area transportationstudy was undertakenfor Tampa,which developedtraffic
forecastsfor the year 1985(Barrand Dunlop1970).A comparisonof the actual
1985traffic volumeswas madewiththoseforecastsmadein 1970.Of 87 different links for which it was possibleto compareactual 1985traffic counts with
those forecastedin 1970,the errors rangedfrom -78 percentto +281 percent,
with an averageabsolutelinkerrorof 57percent.Moreover,theseforecastswere
for a 15-yearperiod-insufficient by today'sstandards.
TampaCBDEmploymentForecasts.Duringthe early-to mid-l 980s, several forecastswerepreparedof futureemploymentin theTampacentralbusiness
district (CBD).As illustratedin Figure1, forecastswere done for a downtown
people mover (DPM) study,for a centralbusinessdistrict developmentof regional impact (CBD ORI),and for severalother conditions.Forecastsdone in
the early l 980sprojectedCBDemploymentto be at 75,000to 80,000by the year
2000. In the mid-1980s,new forecastswere made. By then, it was clear that
CBD employmentwas not on trackto 80,000by the year 2000; instead,it was
forecastthat employmentwouldbe in the 55,000range by the year 2000, but
would still be approaching90,000by the year 20I0. The reality is that, in the
years since 1980,employmentin the TampaCBDhas been fairlyflat, falling in
the 28,000-30,000range in 1998.The rangeof forecastsand the actual perfor-
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Figure1.TampaCBDemployment
forecasts.

mancedemonstratethe extremevolatilityof thesemodelinputs,which,regrettably,have been used as the basis for majorcapitalfacilityplanningin the region,
includinga downtownpeoplemoversystem,a rail transitsystem,and a massive
freewayconstructionprogram.
InterstateHighwayEstimates.An analysisof forecastsof traffic on urban
interstatesreportedthat traffic was overestimatedby 21 percentand 24 percent,
respectively,for three-and seven-yearforecastperiods(Pelland Meyberg 1983).
The authorsof the studyconcludedthat "... one of the most damningpractical
criticisms [of the urban transportationplanningprocess] is that the forecasts
produced... are incorrect."
British Case Studies. The Transportand Road ResearchLaboratorypublished a report (Mackinderand Evans 1981)in whichforecastsfrom 44 British
urbantransportationstudiesundertakenbetween1962and 1971were compared
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with actual occurrences.On average,populationwas overestimatedby 20 percent and highwayand public transit trips by 30 to 35 percent. If one were to
measurethe errors in forecastingthe incrementalchangein variousparameters,
the results would be much worse: averageforecastedpopulationgrowth was
three times the observedgrowth,while forecastsof the growth in total person
trips were more than six timesthe observedgrowth.
GuidewayTransitCaseStudies.Pickrell(1990)examinedthe accuracyof
forecastsfor eight U.S. cities that investedin rail transit projects. Forecastsof
ridership and costs that were the basis of local decisionsto implementthese
systemswere comparedwith the actualcostsand ridershipexperienced.Ridership estimates were found to be consistentlyoverestimated,
while costs were
consistentJyunderestimated.
The studynotedthat decisionsto implementthese
majorcapitalinvestmentsweremadebasedon verysmallforecasteddifferences
in performancebetweenalternatives,whereasthe actualperformanceof the selected alternativeswere substantiallydifferentfromthe forecasts.

Misinterpretation
andOutrightBias
in Individual
andGroupDecisionmaking
The precedingsection dealt with uncertaintyand error primarilywith respect to the inabilityof models to replicateobservedconditions.This section
deals with our inabilityto interpretdata correctly,and even more importantly,
the pervasivenessof outrightbias in the decisionmakingprocess.
Common
Errorsin Individual
Perception

Perhapsthe poor performanceof transportationplanning models should
not be surprising,since our individualintuitivejudgmentsregardingcause and
effectare often flawed.In theirbest-sellingbook,In Searchof Excellence,Peters
and Waterman( 1984) cite the work of psychologistsTversky and Kahneman
(1974),and concludethat" ... peoplereasonintuitively.Theyreasonwithsimple
decisionrules, whichis a simplewayof sayingthat, in this complexworld,they
trust their·gut."Unfortunately,gut feelingsare not necessarilyvalid.
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Mostpeopleattemptto discriminatemuchmorethan their knowledgewarrants (Behn and Vaupel1982).Perhapsthe most significantexampleof individualmisperceptionis the comparativeease with whichwe can come up with
after-the-factexplanationsfor eventsthat we failed to predict (Fischoff1977;
Behnand Vaupel1982;Hogarth1987;Dawes1988).Whenwe reflecton a historicaloccurrence,we searchfor reasonswhy it was entirelypredictable,even
thoughbeforethe eventitselfthe evidencewas very confusing.
Sodo-Political
Biasin Forecasting
andDedsionmaking

Giventhe difficultywe haveas individuals,can it be anywonderthat group
decisionsare even more confounding?Such errors are even more difficultto
deal with, becausethey demonstratenot only our lack of individualability to
deal objectivelywith informationbut also with the bias introducedby conflicting values.As observedby Ascher( 1978),forecaststhat underscorea priority
that is out of politicalfavorare likelyto be ignored,whereasforecaststhat support politicallyfavorablepositionsare likelyto be embraced.
Relianceon Myth and Metaphor.In his provocativeanalysisof the decision
to build a rail transit system in Los Angeles,JonathanRichmond( 1995) describes the process wherebymythsare constructedthrough images, symbols,
and metaphors,whichprovidecompellingmessageson what is goodand bad in
our world.He believesthat a centralfeatureof mythdevelopmentis the focuson
a tec}µlologythat can serve as the center of attention,one of simplicityand
certainty.Technologyserves as a symbol;rather than deal with the complex
myriadproblemsthat need to be solved,technologyallowsus to focus on the
"easy fix" to all of our problems.
MakingForecastsSupportOurPreconceptions.Toooftenour forecastsreflect what we desire, rather than what is likelyto occur.As noted by the U.S.
Departmentof Transportationand the EnvironmentalProtectionAgency,forecasteddistributionsof regionalpopulationand employmentare oftenan erroneous inputto the transportationplanningmodelsbecauseof the influenceof political compromise,rather than technicalexpertise(U.S. DOT 1993).Human
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naturebeingwhat it is, we are morewillingto entertainevidencethat supports
our viewof theworldandareresistantto contradictoryevidence(Hogarth1987).
EthicsandBiasofAdvocacyin Forecasting.
Wachs( 1986)relatestinkering
withforecaststo the issueof professionalethics.Henotesonestudyin whichthe
modelspredicted"insufficient"rail ridership.Tocorrectthis situation,assumed
highwayspeedswerereducedfrom45 mph to a "morerealistic"30 mph.This
simpleassumptionsubstantiallyincreasedtheforecastof rail ridership.He notes
that most of the forecastsusedin planningof U.S.rail transitsystemsare statementsof advocacy,ratherthanunbiasedestimates.
Recommended
Changes
to theUrbanlransportation
Planning
Process
Our inabilityto controluncertaintydictatessubstantialchangesin the way
wedourbantransportation
planning.Theassumptionof a rationaldecisionmaking
processth~tunderliescurrenttransportation
practicedoesnot exist.Rather,what
has been observedis a technicalprocessthat is incapableof forecastingconditions 20 years into the futureand a politicalprocessthat systematicallyand deliberatelycontrivesforecaststo justifypreconceptionsof decisionmakers.
In spiteofuncertainty,weneedtoplanforthefutureandto moveproactively
towardthe attainmentof valuedgoals.Moreover,we can adoptplanningpractices that reducebias in our decisionmaking
process.
This sectionpresentsstrategiesconsideredto be mostsuitablefor application to urban transportationplanning,alongwith specificactionsneededto incorporatethem into the process.

Definea StrategicVision
Thetransportationplanningprocessshouldbeginby articulatinga strategic
vision.This wouldbest be accomplishedas part of a comprehensivestrategic
planningprocess.Weneedto be ableto articulatea visionof whatwe wantour
communityto be "whenit growsup."
The vision need not be a dramaticdeparturefrom the past. On the other
hand,the·visionmightcallfor sweepingchangesto the characterof the area.The
visionwill needto incorporatelanduse, communitydevelopment,protectionof
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naturalresources,andtransportation.Thevisionwillnecessarilybe strategic-it
will incorporatethe generaldesiredfeaturesbut will not rigidlydefine precise
details,as thesemust be responsiveto the unknowablefuture.
HighlightUncertainties
throughStrategic
Planning

Strengths,Weaknesses,Opportunities,and Threats.Oncea strategicvision
has beenarticulated,the recommendedprocesswouldundertakea classicalstrategicplanningapproachthat identifiesstrengths,weaknesses,opportunities,and
threatsto reachingthe desiredvision.Thisactivityrepresentsa radicaldeparture
from traditionalplanningpractice,whichevaluatesall availableinformationto
estimatea singleexpectedvaluefor each variable.The productof the strategic
planningprocessshouldbe an identificationof all conceivablerisks and a proposedactionfor dealingwith them.
HighlightUncertainties.A criticalelementof a new processshouldbe the
articulationof all assumptionsand all uncertaintiesassociatedwith forecasting
futureconditions.Thispracticewill requirea newawarenesson the part of professionalstaffof the importanceof assumptionsin the analyticalprocess.However, it is vitally importantthat decisionmakersand the communitybe made
fullyawareof the uncertainties,particularlycriticalinputsto the transportation
planningmodels:population,laborforce,and employment.
ScenarioAnalysis/Rangesof Assumptions.The strategicplanningprocess
shouldexplicitlyconsiderspecificrangesof assumptions,as capturedin alternative scenariosof the future. In spite of best availableprojections,what is the
chancethat studyareapopulation,laborforceor employmentwill be IOpercent
higheror lowerthan the best guessestimate?Twentypercenthigher?Errors of
this magnitudeneed to be expectedand anticipated.
PromoteRexibility

Once we admitthe realityof uncertainty,flexibilitybecomesvery important. In a futurethat holdsunanticipatedsurprises,we need to placea high value
on retainingfutureoptions.
Right-of WayProtection.One measurethat could be implementedto preservefutureoptionsandto emphasizeflexibilityis the earlyacquisitionof trans-
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portationrightsof way.Whileright-of-way
preservationpresentsdifficultpolitical challenges,the benefitsmakeit worthwhile.
Build-Later.Theconceptof a "build-later"alternative,as advocatedby Chu
and Polzin(1996),is recommendedto be includedin majorinvestmentstudies.
In contrastto current practice,in whichend-states20 or more years into the
futureare the basisfor decisionstoday,thebuild-lateralternativewouldresultin
the inclusionof majorinvestmenttimingas an explicitanalysisfactor.
Planfor Incremental
Implementation

Muchof the researchpresentedin this paperpointstowardthe desirability
of incrementalimplementationof majorprojects.Oneof the most controversial
categoriesof transportationinvestmentsis the implementationof major fixed
guidewaytransitprojects,suchas railrapidtransitsystems.Risksanduncertainties, particularlyas they relateto futureridershipand costs,have often made it
impossibleto musterthe necessarypoliticalsupportto implementsuchsystems,
which are.typicallyrepresentedin the form of optimisticassessmentsof outcomes20 to 50 years intothe future.
Can it be any surprisethat electedofficialsare reluctantto committo systems that will involvemassivepresentcostsin returnfor uncertainfuturebenefits?Becausewe makeonlygrandioseplans,all wehaveto showis plans,while
we might actuallyimplementsomethingone step at a time. Such an approach
mightbeginby offeringexpressbusserviceusingmakeshiftpark-and-ridelots.
As demand increases,permanentand perhapsmore ideally-locatedpark-andride facilitiescan be constructed.
As warrantedby demand,dedicatedhighoccupancyvehicle(HOV) facilities can be implementedor preferentialbustreatmentscan be devisedthat allow
busesto circumventspecifichighcongestiondelaypoints.As each of theseactionsis taken,basedon affirmationin the formof ridership,politicalsupportfor
the next incrementof investmentwillbuild.Ultimately,the additionof a guidewaytransitsystemcan bejustified,withthe park-and-rideinfrastructurealready
in place.
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Place GreaterEmphasison the ShortRun. Uncertaintyincreaseswith duration-not a majorrevelation,but,surprisingly,a factthat is frequentlyignored.
Regrettably,a conditionof federalparticipationin projectshas been assurance
that improvementsmeetanticipatedtrafficlevels20 years followingopeningof
the project.Moreover,this requirementwill almostalwaysnegatethe potential
of systemsand demandmanagementactionsas alternativesto majorcapitalimprovements.
The focus of transportationplanningon the 20-yearhorizonneeds to be
changed;instead,more emphasisshouldbe placedon currentdeficiencies,and
on the five-yearhorizon.Ratherthan focuson the developmentof a static plan
for 20 years into the future,a dynamicprocessis recommendedthat identifies
improvementneeds in five-yearincrements.Initially,as suggestedby Pickrell
(1990),alternativeactions for copingwith immediatedeficienciesshould be
evaluated.Followingthis, forecastswouldbe made of conditionsat five-year
incrementsinto the future.The emphasisshouldbe on selectinga good short
term plan, to meet the needsof the initialfive-yearperiod,with a sequenceof
improvements_identified
for each subsequentincrement.In contrastto the current process,whichis predicatedon optimizingthe responseto a highlyuncertain 20-yearforecast,the recommendedprocessis focusedon optimizingresponsesin a shorter,five-yeartime frame,with an eye on the long term.
Alternativesthat Canbe Implementedin UsableModules.An examplewas
providedof an alternativeapproachto the implementationof guidewaytransit
systems.Ratherthan focusingon a systemjustified with forecastsof demand
decadesinto the future,the alternativeapproachcalledfor incrementalimplementationbeginningwith temporarypark-and-ridelots, transitioningto HOV,
ultimatelyresultingin guidewaytransit,if warranted.
A modalalternativethat meritsmuchmoreconsiderationis that of exclusivebuswaysystems.A majoradvantageof a buswaysystemis that, if properly
staged,evensmallincrementsprovidenotableoperationaladvantages.Each incrementoffersimprovedlevelsof servicefor the bussystem,contrastedwithrail
guidewayalternatives,for which a substantialportion of the system must be
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completedin orderto achieveanybenefits.A recentpaperby Martinelli( 1994)
providesampleevidenceof the benefitsaffordedby busways.He notesthat the
buswaycombinesthe flexibilityof a busto go anywherewiththe line haul characteristicsof fixed guidewaytransitservices,at substantiallylowercost. The
Ottawaand Pittsburghexclusivebuswaysystemsare citedas examplesof operationalefficiency,the formercarrying210,000passengersdaily.
A key featureof the buswayalternativeis that it can be implementedin
increments,eachof whichprovidesmeasurablebenefits.An importantimplication of uncertaintyis that technologiesthat can be implementedin usableincrementshavean advantage.
PromoteObjectivity

While the urban transportationplanningprocesscannot (and should not)
removepoliticsfrom decisionmaking,the processshouldpromotethe separation of politicsfromforecastingandimpactanalysis.Therole-indeed, the ethical responsibility-of the transportationplannershouldbe to provideobjective
analysisin a publicforumthat allowselecteddecisionmakers
to makeinformed
politicaltradeoffs.As those with experiencein the processwill attest, this is
easiersaid than done.The specificrecommendations
of this and the next major
sectionare designedto promoteobjectivityso that politicaltradeoffsare made
basedon our best availabletechnicalanalysis.
IncorporateIndependentPeerReviews.Allofus haveexperiencedinstances
in whichour closeday-to-dayparticipationin a projecthas blindedus to factors
that are evidentto outsiders.It is easy to get so involvedin a project that we
"cannotsee the forestfor the trees."
It is recommendedthat the preparationof regionaltransportationplans,
major corridor analyses,and major activitycenter studies incorporatea new
task, an outsideprofessionalpeer review.Effectivepeer reviewscan serve as a
checkon basicinputassumptions,technicalprocedures,demandforecasts,cost
estimates,andthe wholerangeof socio-political
bias.Partof the taskof the peer
reviewwouldbe to documentuncertaintiesand assumptions(explicitand implied).
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The benefitsof a peer reviewprocesscan bestbe ensuredif the peer panel
is sponsoredby an organizationwith a measureof independencefromthe study
beingreviewed.In the case of projectsinvolvinglargesumsof federaldollars,it
might be appropriateif the cognizantfederalagencyassemblesand retains a
peer panel from outsidethe geographicregion.At the state level, it might be
appropriatefor the state departmentof transportationto retain an outsidepeer
panel as a conditionof expendinglargesumsof statedollars.
SeparatePlanningfrom Implementation.One of the most obviousfactors
worki~gagainstobjectivedevelopmentof capitalimprovementsis conflict of
interestof agenciesand firms with a vested interestin capital intensivesolutions.In Florida,we haveseenthe creationof regionalcommuterrail authorities
chargedwith studyingand implementingcommuterrail systems.Whathappens
if objectivestudyshowsthat a rail systemis unwarranted?There is merit to the
classicalseparationof regionalplanningand projectimplementation,as it requiresimplementingagenciesto havethe endorsementof the metropolitanplanning organizationas a conditionof projectimplementation.This requirement
promotescomprehensiveanalysisof alternatives.
Regrettably,we cannotalwaysrelyon professionalconsultantsto evaluate
objectivelythe feasibilityof majorcapitalprojectswhenthey have millionsof
dollars in design fees riding on a favorabledecision.It is recommendedthat,
whenconsultingfirms are retainedfor technicalassistancein evaluatingalternatives,conflict-of-interest
considerationsshoulddictatethat firms involvedin the
planninganalysisbe prohibitedfroma majorrole in the designcontracts.While
many consultingfirms have a high degreeof ethics and can be relied upon to
exerciseobjectivejudgmentwithoutregardto futurecontracts,the motivations
for bias are too strongto overlook.
PlacetheConsequences
of RiskwithDecisionmakers

Whenthe bulk of the cost burdenof majorcapitalinvestmentsfor a given
localityis borne by others,there is little incentiveto makecarefuldecisionson
resourcecommitments.This is particularlytrue of discretionaryprojects,and in
the currentvernacular,"demonstrationprojects,"whichtranslateto politicalear-
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marking.An intelligentresourceallocationsystemshouldbe one in whichthe
risks of aeceptingoptimisticforecastsof demand,cost, etc., are borne by the
group makingimplementationdecisions.A numberof specificmeasurescan
supportthis recommendation.
BroadFormulaGrants.Onemeasurethat ISTEApromotedwas to reduce
the numberof categoricallimitationson applicationof federalfunds.There is
considerablemerit to the allocationof federaland state supportby means of
broadformulagrantsthat allowsubstantiallocaldiscretionas to whichspecific
projectsareundertaken,withoutregardto categoricallimitationsanddifferences
in matchingratios.Tothe extentthatlocalofficialsarerequiredto allocatefixed
fundingamounts,the consequencesof poordecisionswouldrest moresquarely
on localshoulders.If localdecisionswerepoor,localareaswouldsuffer,withno
hope of state or federalbailout.
Anotheralternative,suggestedby Polzin( 1995),would limit the federal
commitmentto majortransitcapitalinvestmentsto a fixedamountper passenger carried,therebyplacingthe risksof optimisticdemandand cost estimates
squarelyon the shouldersof localdecisionmakers.
IncreaseLocalFundingResponsibilities.
Anothermeasureis to reducefederal supp<1rt
for local transportationinvestments,placingmore of the funding
burdenon stateand localagencies,which,in tum, are moredependenton local
sourcesof tax support.Thoughtherelativemeritsof shiftingmoreresponsibility
for fundingto the state and locallevelwill be evaluatedin the politicalarena,
there can be littledoubtthat placingfundingresponsibilityat the same levelat
whichimplementationdecisionsare madewill hold localofficialsmuchmore
accountablefor rationaldecisionmaking.
Closing
Uncertaintyis pervasivein all of ourplanningactivities.Yet,we plan as if
we couldtake a snapshot20 yearsintothe futureand devisean optimalsolution
to that snapshot.Weignoreandevendisguisethe limitationsof our methodsand
fail to developcontingenciesfor the uncertaintiesthat mayarise.
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It is believedthat the implementationof the approachesoutlinedin this
paperwill allowus to recognizeuncertainty,yet not be paralyzedby it; to move
proactivelytowardthe attainmentof valuedsocietalobjectives,yet be prepared
for the changeswe cannotpredict.•:•
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